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Strandell v. Jackson County and G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The Failure of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to Narrow the
Interpretation of Rule 16 and Limit the Inherent
Power Doctrine
The federal district courts have been overburdened by increased
caseloads. 1 In response, trial judges have attempted to clear the burgeoning dockets by taking more assertive managerial control over their
cases in order to increase the number of early settlements. 2 Many settlements have been reached during the pretrial period through use of
judicial management and extrajudicial procedures. The trend towards
more active judicial management and alternative dispute resolution
techniques has been applauded in many instances. 8 Several inventive
pretrial procedures, such as the summary jury trial (SJT);' court-anI. "By June 30, 1988, a total of 241,975 civil and criminal cases were pending before 575
authorized district court judgeships, for an average of 473 cases per judge." ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
U.S. CoURTS, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 5, 7, noted in, Lambros, The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 789,
792 (1989) (footnote omitted). See R. PoSNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 5977 (1985) (warning that courts are dangerously overloaded).
2. Studies show that a trial judge who "intervenes personally at an early stage to assume
judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by the parties of the principal
pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less costs and
delay than when the parties are left to their own devices." FED. R. C1v. P. 16 advisory committee's note, 1983 amendments.
3. See Elliott, Managerial judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
306, 326-34 (1986) (arguing that judicial management results in more just, speedy, and efficient
disposition of cases); Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2207-09 (1989) (noting the rise of judicial case management);
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1988) (suggesting the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques in specialty areas of
the law); Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505
(1984) (responding to Professor Resnik's criticism of managerial judges). But see Resnik, Failing
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986) (criticizing the shift
in role of judges from adjudicators to case managers); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
366, 385 (1986) (criticizing the unscientific evaluation of the summary jury trial and other ADR).
4. A summary jury trial is a condensed trial proceeding (generally taking one half to one day
to complete) in which attorneys give summarized evidence to a six-member jury. See Lambros,
Summary jury Trial, 37 FED'N INs. & CoRP. CouNs. Q. 139, )39-48 (1987) (outlining the basic
structure of the SJT); Lambros, The Summary jury Trial-An Alternative Method of Resolving
Disputes, 69 jUDICATURE 286, 286 (1986) (introducing SJT as one form of ADR); Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 829 (1986) (relating Judge Speigel's successful use of the
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nexed arbitration/1 and the mini-trial, 6 have been employed in facilitating settlements. 7
This comment focuses on an analysis of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in (1) not allowing a federal court judge to require a litigant to
participate in a nonbinding SJT and (2) requiring a defendant corporate representative to appear at a pretrial settlement conference. The
trial court's power to order appearance at a settlement conference and
the court's lack of power to compel mandatory SJTs will be examined
in light of the parameters of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the inherent power doctrine.
The comment is organized into five sections: first, Rule 16(a) and
(c) and the inherent power of the courts are introduced; second, as
background for examination of the trial judge's power to manage the
court's affairs, this comment studies the development of the inherent
power doctrine and Rule 16 interpretation in the Seventh Circuit, focusing primarily on the facts and the reasoning behind the decisions in
Strandell v. Jackson CountyB and G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. joseph
Oat Corp. 9 ; third, the weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit's analysis of
Rule 16 interpretation in the Strandell and Heileman decisions are
examined; and fourth, the Seventh Circuit's rationale in expanding the
inherent power doctrine is presented in the setting of Strandell and
Heileman. The fifth section of this comment concludes that both
Strandell and Heileman do not sufficiently limit the courts' ability to
interpret federal rules and the inherent power doctrine and suggests
that district courts should leave the alteration of federal procedural
rules to the legislative branch when the alteration affects substantive
rights.
SJT). The SJT, an early 1980s innovation of Judge Thomas Lambros of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, was developed to farilitate pretrial settlement and to
reduce the overburdened federal court dockets. See Gwin, The Summary jury Trial: An Fxplanation and Analysis, 52 KY. BENCH AND BAR 16 (1988). See generally Lambros, The Summary
jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 10'l F. R.D. 461 (1984) (stating
that the SJT "can be an effective tool in overcoming the burden of an ever increasing docket" /d.
at 463-64.)
5. In court-annexed arbitration. the parties are instrurted to submit their rase to an arbitrator who renders a nonbinding derision. See generally Lambros, The Fut?ae of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 14 PEPPER DINE L. REV. 801, 802 (1987) (reviewing procedures involved in courtannexed arbitration). The arbitrator's judgment is entered as an order of the court if both parties
consent. See Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court Administered Arbitration,
69 jUDICATIIRF 27() ( 1986).
6. A minitrial is a proceeding in which the parties present their cases to " neutral moderator
of their choice. See D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATH:ms FOR FEDERAl. DISTRICT jUDGES 7680 (1986) (referring to the minitrial and advocating its use in obtaining settlements).
7. See MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LITIGATION 2D §§ 21.1-21.4 (1'!85).
8. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
9. 871 F.~d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
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INTRODUCTION

Increased use of innovative pretrial procedures may be attributed
to the district courts' attempts to fulfill the mandate of Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 provides that the federal rules
are to be construed so as to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." 10 Unfortunately, "it could be argued
that the application of Rule 1's implicit test is unreasonable because,
whatever was the case in 1938, nothing in today's world is fair, fast,
and cheap." 11
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has attempted to abide by
the spirit of Rule 1 by granting the federal district courts leeway in
pretrial management. However, some of the procedural practices used
by trial judges have been questioned as not being consonant with Rule
16. In this context, the Seventh Circuit has adjudicated two cases dealing with the interpretation of Rule 16 and the inherent power doctrine.
In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit determined that the parameters of
Rule 16 did not allow the district court's ordering a party to submit to
a mandatory SJT. In the subsequent Heileman case, the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 16 granted district courts power to compel represented parties to appear at a pretrial settlement conference.

A.

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, several of the rules have been substantively amended. Perhaps
because it needed no major improvements, Rule 16 withstood amendment for over forty-five years. "A major purpose" in the rule's amendment "was to recognize, and indeed to embrace, the strong trend toward increased judicial management of litigation from an early stage of
the lawsuit." 12
Rule 16, as amended in 1983, provides in pertinent part:
(a) PRETRIAL CoNFERENCES; OBJECTIVES. In any action, the court
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences
before trial for such purposes as
(I) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will
not be protracted because of lack of management;

10. FFD. R. CIV. P. 1.
11. Nordenberg, The Future of Federal Litigation, 50 U. PnT. L. RI<V. 701, 701 (1989).
12. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A l>ook at the Theory and Pmrtia of Rulemaking, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1'/(,9, I'JH5 (I'JH9).
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( 5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT PRETRIAL CoNFERENCES. The
participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take
action with respect to
( 1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the
elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;

(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute;
(1 0) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action. 18

Several members of the judiciary, and some academicians, interpret the
amendments as advocating the movement for a judge to be more involved in encouraging settlements and to be less of a neutral
adjudicator. 14

B.

The Inherent Power Doctrine

When one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as Rule
16, fails to specifically address an issue, courts have often relied on
their inherent powers to fill the gap. The inherent power doctrine
states that federal district courts are "necessarily vested" with control
"to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." 16 In Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 16 the
Third Circuit defined three areas in which federal courts have utilized
the inherent power doctrine: (1) courts have power, within an "extremely narrow range," to act "notwithstanding contrary legislative direction," this power being grounded in the separation of powers doc13. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
14. See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 1986; see generally AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY
ON "PATHS TO A 'BETTER WAY': LITIGATION, ALTERNATIVES, AND ACCOMMODATION" 90-97,
A25-A28 (Background Paper July 1988) (encouraging judicial management) noted in Shapiro,
supra note 12, at 1976 n.21. But see Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1095 (1984)
(advocating that settlement should not become institutionalized); Galanter, The Emergence of the
judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JuDICATURE 257, 258-59 (1986).
15. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). See infra text accompanying notes
102-19.
16. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane).
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trine; (2) courts have power "necessary to the exercise of all others," of
which the contempt power is pre-eminent; and (3) courts have power to
"provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties." 17 The inherent power doctrine is not governed solely by Rule 16, or any other rule or statute; 18 rather, the doctrine is innately limited to the powers minimally "necessary to the
exercise of all others." 19

II.

BACKGROUND: CASES DEALING WITH RuLE

16

AND INHERENT

POWER

An understanding of Rule 16 and the court's inherent power is
necessary as background for examination of the trial judge's power to
manage the court's affairs. Likewise, an understanding of the precursor
cases is needed to better analyze the facts and reasoning behind the
decisions in Strandell and Heileman.

A.

Pre-1988 Cases

1. The Seventh Circuit cases dealing with Rule 16 and the inherent
power doctrine
In Link v. Wabash Railroad, 20 the Seventh Circuit stated that
"[ c]ourts must be free to use [pretrial procedure] and to control and
enforce its operation. Otherwise, the orderly administration of justice
will be removed from control of the trial court and placed in the hands
of counsel." In affirming the Seventh Circuit Link case, the Supreme
Court fleshed out the definitional aspects of inherent power. 21
In two subsequent cases, the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 16's
specific language limits a court's authority over pretrial proceedings.
First, in ].F. Edwards Construction Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard
Rail Corp., 22 the court did not allow for the disposition of issues of fact
or law without fulfilling the requirements of other rules. Additionally,
the J.F. Edwards court held that Rule 16 did not permit a trial judge
to order counsel to stipulate to facts. Then, in Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Systems, Inc., 23 the Seventh Circuit held that because
Rule 16 is intended to be noncoerciv~, a court could not compel the
17. /d. at 562-63; Note, Settling a Case: A Court's Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions
Before and After Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 539, 546 (1986).
18. Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31.
19. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 34 (1812).
20. 291 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1961), affd, 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
21. 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
22. 542 F.2d 1318, 1325 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
23. 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977).
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parties to engage in further discovery.
The Seventh Circuit continued to place limitations on actions relating to Rule 16 and the inherent power. In 1978, the court commented on the use of inventive experiments: "Innovative experiments
may be admirable, and considering the heavy case loads of district
courts, understandable, but experiments must stay within the limitations of the statute." 24 In 1987, the Seventh Circuit stated that "summary procedures are not designed for the resolution of factual disputes
by judges.... Procedures designed to help lawyers settle cases are not
appropriate for judicial resolution of contested issues." 25
In the precursor to the Seventh Circuit's Strandell case, Chief
Judge Foreman held that Rule 16 grants trial judges the authority to
order participation in SJTs. 26 The Southern District of Illinois court's
decision was subsequently vacated in Strandell.

2.

Views of other jurisdictions on Rule 16 and inherent power

Other jurisdictions present views conflicting to that of the Seventh
Circuit. One federal district court in Florida held, in Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 27 that the purpose of Rule 16 is "to allow
courts the discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and effective
case management and disposition." In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.
v. General Electric Co., 28 an Ohio court held that a court is authorized
to order mandatory SJTs. A federal district court in Minnesota found
it unimaginable that "the drafters of the 1983 amendments [to Rule 16]
actually intended to strengthen courts' ability to manage their caseloads
while at the same time intended to deny the court the power to compel
participation by the parties to the litigation." 29
Several courts in Kentucky have commented on the inherent power
of the court to manage its caseload; for example, in McKay v. Ashland
Oil, Inc., the court concluded that mandatory participation in SJTs is
within the inherent power of the trial courts. 30 Moreover, in Lockhart
v. Patel, 31 the court held that federal courts have the authority to order
24. Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 808 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987).
26. Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987), vacated, 838 F.2d 884
(7th Cir. 1987).
27. 119 F.R.D. 448, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988), cf Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d
266 (6th Cir. 1985).
28. 117 F.R.D. 597, 599-600 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
29. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 607 (D. Minn. 1988).
30. 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); see also W. BERTELSMAN & K. PHII.IPPS, KENTUCKY PRACTICE, RUI.E 16, at 20 (Supp. 1987); Gwin, supra note 4, at 16.
31. 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987).

157]

RULE 16/INHERENT POWER

163

the attendance of attorneys, parties and insurers at settlement conferences, and that this authority "is so well established as to be beyond
doubt." 32 In this context, the Lockhart court intimated that the adoption of means to reduce docket pressures could take the form of SJTs. 33
B.

Strandell v. Jackson County

Until 1987, the general practice of compulsory SJTs remained unchallenged in several jurisdictions. 34 In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit
held that Rule 16 did not authorize a court to compel parties to participate in a nonbinding SJT. 35 This case is significant because it departs
from the expansion of the inherent power doctrine. Furthermore, the
Strandell decision imposes boundaries on the interpretation of Rule
16.36

1.

The facts in Strandell

At the trial level of Strandell, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois believed it could mandate a SJT. 37 The
attorney for the civil rights plaintiffs refused to participate in a SJT
ordered by the district court judge. Plaintiffs' counsel argued that by
participating in the compulsory SJT, he would reveal privileged work
product-testimonies of witnesses which defense counsel could have
readily obtained through regular discovery process but which defense
counsel failed to do. 38 More significantly, plaintiffs' counsel also argued
that the district court lacked the power to compel him to engage in a
nonconsensual SJT. The trial judge held plaintiffs' counsel in criminal
contempt for failure to proceed with the SJT. The district court predicated its authority to compel the SJT partly upon Rules 16(a) and
(c). as
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the lower court and vacated the contempt order. The only issue before
32. Jd. at 46 (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAl. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§
1526 (1971); j. MoORE, W. TAGGART & j. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 16.16.1,
16.22 (2d ed. 1985)).
33. 115 F.R.D. at 47.
34. See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49 (participation in a SJT could be mandated by a trial
court); Arabian, 119 F.R.D. at 449 (the court may order parties to participate in a SJT); Federal
Reseroe Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 607 (D. Minn. 1988) (compelled participation in SJTs is consistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). See Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials
in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 455 n.1 (1988).
35. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886.
36. !d. at 887.
37. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 336.
38. !d. at 334.
39. !d. at 335-36.
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the court of appeals was whether the federal district court had the
power to compel participation in the nonbinding SJT. The court of
appeals held that Rule 16 does not authorize district courts to compel
parties to participate in SJTs! 0

2.

The reasoning in Strandell

The Seventh Circuit rejected the lower court's expansive interpretation of Rule 16. 41 The appellate court reasoned that although a district court has inherent power to control its docket, it must do so "in
harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 42 As support for
its rationale, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Advisory Committee's
note to Rule 16(c) which provides that the pretrial conference is meant
to facilitate settlement, not "to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants." 43 The Strandell court interpreted the intent of Rule
16 as not allowing "an unwilling litigant to be sidetracked from the
normal course of litigation."" The court also reasoned that Rule 16
only allowed a trial judge to "explor[eJ the use of procedures other
than litigation to resolve the dispute," including "urging the litigants to
employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse."'~
The court stated that its decision was consistent with two previous
Seventh Circuit opinions interpreting Rule 16 as a noncoercive rule. 46
After expressing fear that the mandatory SJT may affect the rules concerning privilege of work product,' 7 the Strandell court concluded that
although a district court may wish to take measures to lessen its
crowded docket, that court may not "avoid the adjudication of cases
properly within its congressionally-mandated jurisdiction." 48

C.

G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.

Rule 16(a) provides that the court may "direct the attorneys for
the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear" for a pretrial
40. 838 F .2d at 888.
41. The Seventh Circuit implied that the district court relied erringly on the factors it used to
reach the conclusion. !d. at 887-88.
42. !d. at 886.
43. !d. at 887 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 16 advisory committee's note).
44. !d.
45. /d. (original emphasis).
46. See ldentiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977); J.
F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1320 (7th Cir.
197 6) (per curiam).
47. 838 F.2d at 888.
48. /d.
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conference. 49 In Heileman, the Seventh Circuit held that inherent
power enhances Rule 16 to authorize a court to compel litigants represented by counsel to attend a pretrial conference. 110 This case is important because the Seventh Circuit unfortunately broadened the interpretation of Rule 16 which the court had earlier narrowed in Strandell. 111

1.

The facts in Heileman

At the trial level of Heileman, a corporate defendant refused to
obey the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin to send a corporate representative with authority to
settle to a pretrial conference. 112 Defendant's counsel contended that he
and another attorney authorized to speak for the corporate principals
were in attendance. Defendant's counsel argued that the district court
lacked the power to compel the corporate principal to appear at the
pretrial settlement conference. The trial judge imposed a sanction of
over $5,000. 113
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's order and held that a court may order attorneys and
unrepresented parties, but not represented parties, to appear for a settlement conference. 114 The Seventh Circuit, on rehearing en bane, vacated the panel's decision and upheld the order. 1111

2.

The reasoning in Heileman

The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the federal rules "do not
completely describe and limit the power of the federal courts," the
courts may exercise authority outside of the rules. 116 The court stated
that district courts possess the inherent power to develop "procedural
techniques designed to make the operation of the court more efficient,
to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, and to control courts'
dockets." 117 The court determined that the court's power to compel appearance of a represented party was, nevertheless, consistent with Rule
16. In its view, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Rule 16 represented "another application of a district judge's inherent authority to
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
vacated
55.
56.
57.

FED. R. C1v. P. 16 (emphasis added).
871 F.2d at 656.
!d. at 651-52.
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
871 F.2d at 651.
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415, 1421 (7th Cir. 1988),
on rehearing 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
871 F.2d at 656-57.
!d. at 651.
Id.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

166

[Volume 4

preserve the efficiency, and more importantly the integrity, of the judicial process. " 58

III.

RULE

16: ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

The focus of this analysis is to examine the weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Rule 16 in the Strandell and Heileman
decisions. In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit stated that the only issue
before it was whether a trial judge could require a litigant to participate in a SJT to promote settlement of the case. 59 The court specifically stated that it was not asked to "determine the manner in which
summary jury trials may be used with the consent of the parties." 60 By
means of spotlighting the weaknesses of the reasoning underlying the
court's decision, this analysis will elucidate the ideas behind the Seventh Circuit's rationale. Specifically, this analysis will show that, with
respect to the limited issue before it, the court in Strandell decided the
issue correctly, but now flawlessly. Contrariwise, this analysis will suggest that the decision in Heileman was faulty.

A.

The Seventh Circuit Did Not Narrow the Interpretation of Rule

16
Rule 16 is a vehicle for change in bringing about more speedy and
efficient determinations. 61 The rule does not address all of the procedures that a trial court can use in facilitating pretrial settlement. 62
However, there is a limit to what procedures can be utilized.
The Strandell opinion displays the limited flexibility of the federal rules, yet fails to address the necessity for district courts to act so as
not to disrupt the delicate balance between the competing concerns of
expediency and individual rights. The decision's failure to constrict judicial innovation is most evident in its handling of the interpretation of
Rule 16. The Seventh Circuit had previously given Rule 16 a narrow
interpretation. 63 Though the court held that Rule 16 does not authorize
mandatory SJTs, the court inadequately relied on the Advisory Com58. !d. at 652.
59. 838 F.2d at 886.
60. !d.
61. "Some judges and some lawyers long ago recognized the need for change, and at least a
few recognized Rule 16, even before amendment, as the vehicle for change." Note, Rule I 6 and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 818-19 (1988).
62. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 496.
63. See ldentiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977); J.
F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1320 (7th C:ir.
1976) (per curiam).
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mittee's note on Rule 16(c) as support for its holding. 64 The Seventh
Circuit should have focused more exactingly on the clear language of
Rule 16. 65 Circuit Judge Manion, in his dissent in Heileman, laid out
this basic principle: "As with any rule or statute, the proper starting
point in interpreting Rule 16 is the rule's language. We should not be
content to rely on general statements about 'liberal construction' and
Rule 16's 'broadly remedial' 'spirit.' " 66

B. The Seventh Circuit Did Not Focus on the Clear Language of Rule
16
Rule 16 should have been the keystone of the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Strandell. The trial court relied on subsections (7) and
(11) of section (c); consequently, the Seventh Circuit repeated the view
of the trial court that these two subsections authorized the mandatory
SJT. 67 The subsections only provide that "[t]he participants ... may
consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute" and
"(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." 68
The plain language of Rule 16(c) suggests that extrajudicial, not judicial, procedures be discussed at a pretrial conference. The Strandell
decision states that "while the pretrial conference of Rule 16 was intended to foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures,
it was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked
from the normal course of litigation." 69 As one commentator observed,
"the decision implies that any other interpretation of Rule 16 would
have signaled that a quiet revolution had occurred in federal pre-trial
practice." 70 The interpretation delineated by the Seventh Circuit in
Heileman is that "Rule 16's specific language limits a court's authority
over pretrial proceedings," 71 of which SJTs are included.
The trial court, quoting Judge Lambros, read Rule 16 in conjunc64. 838 F.2d at 887; See Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to
Order Summary jury Trial Participation, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 483, 494 (1988) ("Much of
Strandell's analysis focused not on the text of the Rule, but on a singlr sentence of the Advisory
Committee notes on Rule 16(c).").
65. For example. one illustrative comment seems to decry broad interpretation of Rule 16: "]
also can find nothing in Rule 16 (pretrial conference) to suggest that judges are authorized to
convene juries to assist in settlement." Posner, supra note 3, at 385.
66. 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion,]., dissenting).
67. !d.
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
69. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
70. Maatman, supra note 34, at 459-60. Gerald L. Maatman was the attorney for the plaintiffs in Strandell.
71. 848 F.2d at 1421.
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tion with Rule 1, which provides that the rules be construed "to secure
the just and speedy determination of an action." 72 The Seventh Circuit
failed to respond with a comment on the interplay between the two
rules. Perhaps the court's argument that Rule 16 is not meant to be
coercive could be construed as a response to the seemingly broad coverage of Rule 1. The court discerned that no language in the amended
Rule 16 or in the Advisory Committee's note suggests that the amendments to Rule 16 "were intended to make the rule coercive." 73 Rule 16
points to extrajudicial procedures only as a possible means for arriving
at a settlement. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit cited with approval
the Second Circuit's comment on the 1983 version of Rule 16: "Rule 16
... was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties-or one of
them-into an involuntary compromise." 74 Reconciliation of the two
rules results when the ostensible broadness of Rule 1 is necessarily tempered by the noncoercive nature of Rule 16.

1.

Strandell 's interpretation of Rule 16

When SJTs were first introduced in the early 1980s, other forms
of alternative dispute resolution had already been embraced by the
courts. 75 Essentially, the development of the law regarding judicial
power to require participation in SJTs originates in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 16; 76 accordingly, the trial court
cited with approval Judge Lambros' analysis for the court's authority:
"The Summary Jury Trial is firmly rooted in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, SJT is within the court's
pretrial powers pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(ll), and the
court's inherent power to manage and control its docket." 77
While the Seventh Circuit's decision in Strandell should be lauded
for its curtailment of the district courts' power to excessively liberalize
the interpretation of federal procedural rules, the decision is lacking in
several respects. Although the case only mentions briefly the danger of
overstepping court boundaries and into "congressionally-mandated ju72. FED. R. C1v. P. 1; 838 F.2d at 887.
73. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
74. !d. at 887 (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
75. See Maatman, supra note 34, at 455. In 1984, the Judicial Conference endorsed the use
of SJTs as a means of promoting the settlement of cases. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS oF
THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (Sept. 1984).
76. For example, "Rule 16(a)(l) and (5) and (c)(11) has been cited as a basis for the utilization of summary jury trial procedures." Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448,
448 (M D Fla. 1988).
77. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335; Lambros, supra note 4, 103 F.R.D. at 469.
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risdiction," 78 the major forte of the Strandell opinion remains its adherence to staying within judicial bounds, i.e., leaving the power to
amend or alter federal rules that affect substantive rights in the hands
of the legislature. In its decision, the court recognizes the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as a product of a process designed to take into account the protection of individual rights. 79
One strength of Strandell is its emphasis on the damage that
could be inflicted upon the work product rule if SJTs were to be made
compulsory. If the plaintiffs in Strandell had been required to participate in the SJT, they would have conceivably had to divulge privileged
testimonies of witnesses. The federal district court at the trial level had
previously denied the defendants' motion to compel production of the
privileged work product. 8 ° Consequently, an attempt to force plaintiffs
to submit to the SJT procedure, thereby causing them to disclose privileged information, would upset the "carefully-crafted balance between
the needs for pretrial disclosure and party confidentiality." 81 Again, the
court was not hesitant to mention that such an attempt would alter the
"judgments contained in Rule 26 and in the case law." 82
The emphasis on the work product privilege was necessary; however, without more analysis and illustration of the inherent power doctrine and the interpretation of the federal rules, the emphasis leaves a
false impression of the importance of the work product privilege. Instead, the rationale behind the inextricable ideas of inherent power and
interpretation of rules should have been given the limelight. The Seventh Circuit failed to point out how a court's compelling plaintiffs' attorney to participate in the SJT would force the attorney to reveal the
privileged information. Judge Posner offered the suggestion that "an
attorney who did not want to make his 'trump card' available to the
opposition before trial, could merely withhold that piece of evidence
from the summary proceeding." 83 The above criticisms are offered as a
means to determine that the Strundell case inadequately addressed and
established the boundaries of Rule 16.

78. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
79. Id. at 886 (quoting S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S.
Com: CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 3023, 3026).
80. Strandell v. Jackson County, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 715 (S.D. Ill. 1986).
81. 838 F.2d at 888.
82. Id.
83. Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CI.EV. ST. L. REv. 43, 54 ( 1980).
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Heileman's interpretation of Rule 16

Although the majority in Heileman was correct in stating what
Rule 16 addresses, the use of pretrial conferences and the discussion of
means for dispensing with unnecessary litigation, 84 the majority was
incorrect in holding that Rule 16 allows federal district courts to compel a represented party's appearance at pretrial settlement conferences.85 The clear language of Rule 16 operates against any such holding. As one of the dissenting judges in Heileman so emphatically
stressed, "the rule mandates in clear and unambiguous terms that
only an unrepresented party litigant and attorneys may be ordered to
appear." 86
The arguments against the majority's holding can be categorized
into three basic propositions. The first proposition embodies the idea
that Rule 16 specifically addresses who may be compelled to appear at
the pretrial conference. That only attorneys and unrepresented parties
may be required to participate in pretrial conferences is manifestly expressed by the rule's multiple references to "attorneys" and "unrepresented parties." Rule 16(a) provides that a court may direct the "attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before
it." 87 Rule 16(b) states that a judge may enter scheduling orders after
"consulting with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
parties." 88 Rule 16(c) requires that "[a]t least one of the attorneys for
each party participating in any conference before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations. " 89 Rule 16(d) directs that the final
pretrial conference be attended by "one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the parties and by any unrepresented parties. " 9° Finally, Rule 16(f) allows sanctions if there is no appearance
made "on behalf of a party." 91 Judge Manion points out that the "only
language in Rule 16(f) specifically addressing appearance does not authorize sanctions if 'a party fails to appear.' " 92 He observes that the
"choice of language is significant. In the normal course, an attorney
appears 'on behalf of' a represented client at a pretrial conference." 93 It
appears, then, that the distinction between represented parties and un84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
/d. at 652.
/d. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (original emphasis).
Fw. R. CIV. P. 16.
/d.

89.

/d.

90. /d.
91. /d.

92. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 667 (Manion,
93. !d.

J.,

dissenting) (original emphasis).
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represented parties was intended by the framers of Rule 16. Though
the majority opinion neglected to place importance on this distinction, it
did make the following admission:
The language of Rule 16 does not give any direction to the district
court upon the issue of a court's authority to order litigants who are
represented by counsel to appear for pretrial proceedings. Instead,
Rule 16 merely refers to the partlClpation of trial advocates-attorneys of record and pro se litigants. 94
Consequently, in stating that Rule 16 did not "limit the power of the
federal rules," 911 the majority had to rely on authority external to Rule
16 to reach its conclusion.
The second proposition used in the argument against the majority
opinion was entirely unaddressed by the majority in Heileman. The
second basic proposition was stated by Judge Manion: "Rule 16's distinction between represented and unrepresented parties is consistent
with a litigant's statutory right to representation by an attorney." 96 The
role of the attorney is one of advocate for her client. Attorneys are often
hired for their ability to effectively persuade the judge or jury and to
present the client's case with the courtroom skills and legal knowledge
which the client may lack. Moreover, as Judge Posner explains, attorneys are hired by clients to "economize on their own investment of time
in resolving disputes. " 97 The drafters of amended Rule 16 envisioned
that their choice of language would undergo a scrutinizing process.
It is incredible to believe that after this careful process, amended Rule

16 would expressly authorize district courts to order only attorneys
and unrepresented parties to appear if the drafters also intended to
allow district courts to order represented parties to appear. This is
especially so given Rule 16's consistent distinction between represented and unrepresented parties, and that distinction's congruence
with the statutory right to representation by an attorney and the attorney's traditional role in litigation. 98
The Seventh Circuit would have been wise to follow Judge Manion's
caution that courts should not "presume that Rule 16's drafters meant
to encroach on a litigant's right to conduct his case through counsel." 99
The third basic proposition used in the argument against the majority opinion was presented by Judge Posner. He believed that though
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Jd. at 651.
Jd.
871 F.2d at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 668 (Manion, J., dissenting).
Id. at 667.
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the panel concluded that Rule 16 carries the negative implication that
no represented party may be directed to appear, Heileman could have
been decided on a narrower ground. 100 Judge Posner posited that
"neither Rule 16 nor any other rule, statute, or doctrine imposes [a
duty to bargain in good faith over settlement before resorting to trial]
on federal litigants." He stated that Heileman could have been decided
on the ground that the magistrate abused his discretion in ordering the
defendant to "send an executive having 'full settlement authority' to the
pretrial conference." 101
IV.

INHERENT PowER: ANALYSIS oF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECISIONS

In both Strandell and Heileman, the Seventh Circuit attempted to
argue that Rule 16 answered the question at hand. Because Rule 16
did not do so, the court in Heileman alternatively relied on the inherent
power doctrine. The undue reliance on the inherent power of the court
broadened the doctrine's applicability. As a result, the Seventh Circuit
fostered the development of new problems by expanding the inherent
power doctrine. 102

A. The Decision Provided a Weak Bridle for the Inherent Power
Doctrine
Although the Seventh Circuit in Strandell properly held that the
district court's power to control and manage its docket does not extend
to requiring participation in SJTs, the court's decision did not go far
enough. The Strandell court should have delineated more clearly the
limitations of the inherent power of federal courts. In Heileman, the
court held that Rule 16 did not limit the inherent power of federal
courts to order represented parties to attend pretrial conferences. Vigorously opposed by several of the circuit judges, this holding allowed the
inherent power doctrine to be unnecessarily expanded.
Besides Rule 16, the other cited authority for mandatory SJTs in
Strandell was the inherent power of the courts. 103 The Seventh Circuit
appropriately emphasized the trial court's admission that "its discretion
in this context is not unbridled." 104 Although the decision in Strandell
affirmatively stated the limitation that courts must exercise inherent
100. ld. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 658.
102. See Tornquist, The Active judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry,
25 Wn.LAMETTt: L. Rt:v. 743, 746 (1989).
103. 838 F.2d at 886.
104. /d. (quoting Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 335).
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powers in "harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 105
that brief mention was insufficient. The United States Supreme Court,
in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, had already issued this admonitory
remark: "Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic
controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion." 106 The
Supreme Court's statement (or a paraphrase of that statement) was not
embodied as a precedential citation in either Strandell or Heileman.
The Strandell and Heileman majority decisions were remiss in
pointing out how several cases set limits to the inherent power. For
example, in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 107 the inherent power was
limited to dismissing a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. In
Roadway, the inherent power was limited to imposition of attorney's
fees for bad faith litigation. 108 The Supreme Court held that any sanction ordered by virtue of the courts' inherent power had to be grounded
in bad faith conduct or conduct tantamount to bad faith. 109 Several
post-Roadway courts restricted the judiciary's inherent powers in imposing sanctions. 110
When dealing with problems of interpretation within the federal
rules, the courts first look to the rules themselves. If the rules fail to
specifically address the issue, the courts look to authority outside of the
rules. According to the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, the
federal rules "contain numerous grants of authority that supplement
the inherent power of the court to manage litigation. Of particular importance are those contained in Rule 16, 26, 37, and 42." 111 The Seventh Circuit erred in Strandell when it failed to look at the particular
word choice in Rule 16. If it had done so, there may have been no need
to look to the inherent power doctrine.
Some examples of the Seventh Circuit's failure to closely examine
the language of Rule 16 are seen in the Strandell case. Conceivably,
the court could have elaborated on the term "extrajudicial" found in
Rule 16(c)(7). The Advisory Committee's note to the 1983 amendments
to Rule 16(c)(7) imply a possible link between the terms "extrajudicial" and "outside the courthouse" in the following statement: "This
105. /d. at 886.
106. 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
107. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962).
108. 447 U.S. at 766-67.
109. /d. at 767.
110. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that sanctions must
be supported by a finding of bad faith); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1983) (determining that sanctions had to be based on a party's bad faith-an unreasonable position that was "without at least a colorable basis in law"); See generally Nizamoff & Wodock,
Inherent Power Sanctions: Why Me, 0 Lord?, 55 DEF. CouNs. J. 58, 59-60 (1988).
111. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D, supra note 7, § 23.11, at 160.

174

B.Y.L. JOCRN,\L OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

includes urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside
the courthouse." 112 As one commentator explained, "A summary jury
trial is hardly an extrajudicial proceeding. Indeed, a summary jury trial
is conducted inside the courtroom of a federal courthouse, before an
Article III judge, and with jurors selected from the court's master jury
wheel who are paid from congressionally apportioned funds." 113 The
examination of specific terms within Rule 16 is only suggested to point
out the necessity for following the clear language of the rule. Had the
court applied a literal interpretation, it might have quickly brushed
aside a portion of the district court's stated authority for the mandatory
SJT.
The court in Strandell should have distinguished the difference
between pretrial conferences and SJTs. In contrast, the court in AicKay
felt that SJTs could be used as extended pretrial conferences. 114 Moreover, the Arabian court reasoned that "[ w ]hat ever name the judge may
give to these proceedings," SJTs and conferences are similar and Rule
16 sanctions themY 6 However, SJTs and conferences are not the same.
The Strandell court could have armed its decision with analysis to the
contrary. The distinction could have been readily made by referring to
the actual text of Rule 16 and the accompanying Advisory Committee
note.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit should have also distinguished a
settlement conference from a SJT. The lower court in Heileman disagreed with Lockhart in that the Lockhart court sanctioned the district
court's power to order attendance at settlement conferences. 116 Assuming, arguendo, that the SJT and the settlement conference are indistinguishable, the Strandell court failed to imply that a court's order requiring the attendance of the parties might be "so onerous, so clearly
unproductive, or so expensive in relation to the size, value, and complexity of the case" that it would be an abuse of discretion to order the
parties themselves to attend a settlement conference. 117
Finally, though the SJT is not a settlement negotiation/ 18 the
court in Strandell could have more convincingly characterized the SJT
as a procedure leading to and closely conjunctive with a settlement negotiation. Infelicitously, the court relied on the Advisory Committee
note's implication that Rule 16(c) was not intended to "impose settle-

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

818 F.2d at R87 (quotin~ Frn. R. Crv. P. 16 advisory committee's note).
\laatman. supra note 34. at 47H.
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 41, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
Arabian American Oil Co. v..~carfone. 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
848 F.2d at 1420.
Heileman, 107 F.R.D. at 217.
Note, Compelling Alternatives, supra note 64, at 494.
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ment negotiations on unwilling litigants." 119 Although the SJT and the
settlement negotiation were improperly conjoined, that association is
not fatal to the Strandell analysis.

B. A Limitation of the Inherent Power in Strandell May Have Prevented the Heileman Outcome
The remainder of this comment will discuss other points in which
the Seventh Circuit's rationale with regard to the inherent power doctrine was lacking. First, the analysis to follow will examine the dissenting opinions in Heileman with the purpose of highlighting language
which, if hypothetically inserted in the Strandell decision, may have
affected the outcome in Heileman. Second, this comment will propose
that the Seventh Circuit could have more assertively set bounds for the
judiciary and cautioned courts against treading upon the realm of the
legislature.
In light of the dissenting opinions and the proposition that this
comment attempts to support, it is suggested that Judge Manion set
adequate limitations on the inherent power doctrine. "Inherent power
is not a license for federal courts to do whatever seems necessary to
move a case along. Inherent power is simply 'another name for the
power of courts to make common law when statutes and rules do not
address a particular area.' " 120 The justices who authored the dissenting opinions effectively bolstered their argument that the inherent
power doctrine is limited. "Since inherent power's purpose is to fill
gaps left by statute or rule," Judge Manion continues, "it necessarily
follows that where a statute or rule specifically addresses a particular
area, it is inappropriate to invoke inherent power to exceed the bounds
the statute or rule sets." 121 Though more applicable in disputing the
expansive holding of Heileman, this limitation is readily apropos in
arguing against the interpretation of Rule 16 in Strandell.
Judge Ripple curtails the enlargement of the inherent power doctrine by limiting judicial officers to "a substantial degree of inherent
authority to deal with individual situations-as long as that authority is
exercised in conformity with the policies embodied in the national
rules." 122 Not only would inherent power be limited by the federal
rules themselves but also by the policies embodied in the federal rules.
Judge Posner admonished against the "obvious dangers in too
119.
120.
Escanaba
121.
122.

FED. R. C1v. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting) (quoting Soo Line R.R. Co. v.
& Lake Superior R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 546, 551 (7tb Cir. 1988)).
871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting).
!d. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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broad an interpretation of the federal courts' inherent power to regulate
their procedure." 123 The Seventh Circuit's brief acknowledgement in
Strandell of the district court's "substantial inherent power to control
and to manage its docket" was insufficient. 124 The freedom to interpret
inherent power expansively is subject to constitutional constraints notwithstanding the language of Article III of the Constitution.
The Heileman court relied on the inherent power doctrine because
of Rule 16's failure to give direction upon the specific issue before the
court. If the Seventh Circuit in Strandell had elaborated on Rule 16's
limitation, then the Seventh Circuit may have decided Heileman relying on the precedent set in Strandell and, therefore, may not have been
tempted to reach out to the inherent power doctrine to bolster its holding. If it were possible to take language from a yet undecided case
(Heileman) and insert it in the case at hand (Strandell), then Judge
Coffey's elaboration on the limited application of Rule 16 may have
been instrumental in averting the outcome in Heileman. Judge Coffey
elucidates what the Strandell court failed to point out-the inextricable
relationship between the inherent power doctrine and the federal rules:
The majority upsets [the appropriate balance between the needs for
judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant] and acts
contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate in the Bank of Nova Scotia case when it relies upon an alleged "inherent authority" to permit
district court judges to exercise a power which the drafters of Rule 16
explicitly denied them.m

The statement in Strandell that the inherent power must be "exercised
in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"126 is too weak to prevent the outcome in Heileman. The Seventh
Circuit in Strandell should have used more forceful language, i.e, similar to Judge Coffey's declaration that the "newly created 'inherent authority' ... is based upon a legal foundation of quicksand." 127

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. District Courts Should Beware Rash Procedural Innovations that
Infringe on Substantive Rights
The district courts within the Seventh Circuit should be careful as
they innovate with various procedures. "The delicate balance between
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

!d. at 657
Strandell,
Heileman,
Strandell,
Heileman,

(Posner, J.,
838 F.2d at
871 F.2d at
838 F.2d at
871 F.2d at

dissenting).
886.
660 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
886.
661 (Coffey,]., dissenting).
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efficiency and fairness created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is altered by procedural innovation." 128 Professor Resnik has observed
that "the history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural reforms." 129
Judicial activism, in the form of procedural innovation that infringes on
substantive rights, should be curtailed. 130
The methods used to encourage pretrial settlement should be carefully scrutinized. 131 For instance, the Manual for Complex Litigation,
Second, cautions "that the role of the judge in settlement is an uncertain one and recommends judicial restraint in several respects. " 132
"Neither the bench nor the bar agrees on the role a trial judge should
play in bringing about a settlement." 133 The Seventh Circuit in
Strandell and Heileman did not argue that the mandatory SJT and the
compulsory pretrial conference attendance were possibly outcome-determinative according to the Supreme Court's Colgrove 134 test. The court
could have asserted that the Colgrove test should be applied on a caseby-case basis. In the particular factual situation of Strandell, the Seventh Circuit could have successfully defended the mandatory SJT as an
excessive intrusion into the independence of plaintiffs' attorney. 135 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit could have reasonably submitted that a
mandatory SJT would have been determinative of the ultimate outcome
of the litigation, given Strandell's particular factual scenario. In Heileman, the court did not argue that the substantive right to representation by counsel may be affected by the court's order to compel the represented party's appearance at the pretrial conference.
128. Tornquist, supra note 102, at 744.
129 Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 624 (1985).
130. Contra Lambros, supra note 1, at 806. Judge Lambros believes that trial judges should
"take an active role in managing and administering their dockets. And in this sense, I consider
myself a judicial activist, a procedural judicial activist." !d. However, as Lambros elaborates,
"[P]rocedural activism is in no way related to substantive activism. While substantive activism is
concerned with philosophical questions concerning the application of our Constitution, procedural
activism addresses only the means of processing disputes." /d.
131. See Tornquist, supra note 102, at 747. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting, joined by Easterbrook, Ripple & Manion).
132. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?,
62 ST JoHN's L. REv. 493, 502 (1988). "Despite the [Manual's] status in the law as only a set
of recommendations, it has the force and effect of law since it is frequently cited as a primary
source of procedural authority." !d. at 498; see, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
133. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D, supra, note 7, § 23.11, at 160.
134. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), construed in McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120
F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1988). In Colgrove, the Supreme Court reasoned that a local rule
could be upheld based on its non-interference with "those aspects of the litigatory process which
bear upon the ultimate outcome of the litigation." 413 U.S. at 155.
135. See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45-46.
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The Seventh Circuit failed to accentuate the demarcation between
the roles of the judiciary and the legislature. As the Seventh Circuit
perceived in an earlier case, "the ease and speed with which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be amended by those whom Congress
entrusted with the responsibility for doing so should make federal
judges hesitate to create new forms of judicial proceedings in the teeth
of existing rules." 136 The power to order mandatory SJTs requires an
amendment to Rule 16. Similarly, Rule 16 requires amendment in order to allow compulsion of represented parties to appear at pretrial
conferences.

B. The Seventh Circuit Should Set the Boundary Between the judiciary and the Legislature
The Seventh Circuit aptly emphasized that the federal rules "are a
product of a careful process of study and reflection" which reflects the
responsibilities of the legislature and the judiciary. 137 The court also
acknowledged that the rules are cognizant "both of the need for expedition of cases and the protection of individual rights." 138 Therefore, it
should follow that where the Supreme Court and Congress have addressed "the appropriate balance between the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant," innovations such as
mandatory SJT and mandatory appearance of represented parties at
pretrial conference "must conform to that balance." 139 If the district
court in Heileman is to be granted the power to remove a litigant's
right to representation by counsel, then "let it be accomplished through
the accepted channels of the Supreme Court and Congress of the
URited States." 140
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Rules Enabling Act which
"reflects the joint responsibility of the legislative and judicial branches
of government." 141 The federal rules are promulgated under the aegis
of the Rules Enabling Act. The Act provides that the federal rules
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 142 The
Rules Enabling Act also limits the Supreme Court's power to establish
rules governing the federal district courts. The Supreme Court, for instance, must consider the substantive rights of individuals in construing
136.
137.
138.
CoNG. &
139.
140.
141.
142.

Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886.
!d. (quoting S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 L:.s. Com:
ADMIN. Nt:ws 3023, 3026).
!d. at 887.
Heileman, 871 F.2d at 663 (Coffey, j., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
!d. at 671; See 28 USC.§ 2072 (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1982).
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the federal rules. 143
That the Seventh Circuit realized any amendment to substantive
rights within the federal rules to be outside the scope of the judiciary is
evident in its cautionary statement, "we can expect that the national
rule-making process outlined in the Rules Enabling Act will undertake
[such radical surgery] in quite an explicit fashion." 144 The Seventh Circuit should be cognizant of the need for separation of legislative and
judicial powers; however, its decision in Strandell failed to sufficiently
emphasize that necessary distinction, and its decision in Heileman
failed to apply that distinction. Noting that the majority misapplied and
inappropriately expanded the inherent power doctrine, Judge Ripple
postulated that the Rules Enabling Act "hardly contemplates the broad,
amorphous, definition of the 'inherent power of the district judge,' ...
articulated by the majority." 1411
Legislation has been proposed to Congress to amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to allow federal district judges to enter orders
governing consensual SJTs. 146 "The fact that such legislation has been
offered intimates that statutory authority under Rule 16 is lacking,"
argues one commentator. 147 The Seventh Circuit's oversight in not emphasizing the separation of rule-making power demonstrates that the
analytical basis of the Strandell decision was incomplete. Consequently, the insufficient Strandell opinion permitted the subsequent
case of Heileman to broaden not only the interpretation of federal rules
but also the inherent power doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Strandell v. Jackson
County reversed the lower court's decision and thereby removed from
its district courts the power to compel participation in nonbinding
SJTs. While this accomplishment is commendable, the court did not go
far enough in limiting the inherent power doctrine and in narrowing
the interpretation of Rule 16. Nor did the court satisfactorily stress in
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. joseph Oat Corp. that the proper boundary between the judiciary and legislature precluded any broadening of
the inherent power doctrine or the interpretation of the federal rules.
The Seventh Circuit has transformed from a tribunal that has limited
the discretion of district courts to read Rule 16 as compelling
143. /d.
144. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888 (footnote omitted).
145. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
146. See H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 133 CoNG. REC. 157 (1987) ("Alternative
Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1987"); S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 132 CoNG. REC.
848 ( 1986) ("Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986"). As of date, the bills have
not been enacted. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 804.
147. Maatman, supra note 34, at 479.
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mandatory SJTs into a tribunal that allows district courts to compel
action that diverges from the specific language and intent of Rule 16.
This shift in the court's view is disturbing because it connotes an unwillingness to curb the expansion of judicial constraints intrinsic to the
rules and statutes by which the judiciary is to abide.

Farol Parco

